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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on a unique panel dataset of supporters of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) the study 
shows that programmatic differences between supporters of Frauke Petry and Bernd Lucke cannot 
sufficiently explain the crucial intra-party leadership contest of July 2015. Programmatic 
differences were minor in 2013, but became pronounced over time. Politically active supporters 
were disaffected with the old moderate leadership of Bernd Lucke, who pursued an organizational 
reform to reduce the influence of the rank-and-file. Social media also played a key role for the 
leadership turnover, as alternative news sources on social media were only politicized by the intra-
party opposition. It is conceivable that the structure of social media networks influences opinion 
formation processes and internal affairs of right-wing populist parties in general, as their 
supporters tend to have low trust in mainstream news. 
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1. Introduction 
Germany has been a special case among Western postindustrial societies with regard to the absence 
of a successful right-wing populist party.1 While such parties were well-established in many 
neighboring countries and have joined governing coalitions, their electoral appeal has been 
ephemeral and restricted to state and local elections in Germany. No right-wing party has passed 
the threshold for parliamentary representation on the national level until 2017 – a failure that had 
its roots in Germany’s political culture centered on the Nazi past, which reacted dismissively to 
any attempt to establish a right-wing populist party (Art, 2005).  
The Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) is the most promising 
attempt to establish a successful party at the right of the German party system – particularly after 
entering national parliament with 12.6 percent in Germany’s 2017 national election. It began as 
soft Eurosceptic party with a market-liberal orientation in 2013 (Arzheimer, 2015a; Jankowski et 
al., 2017; Schmitt-Beck, 2017). From the beginning, however, different factions were competing 
over the programmatic orientation of the party. The conflict culminated in July 2015 in a leadership 
contest, in which co-leader Frauke Petry defeated frontrunner and economist Bernd Lucke. Petry’s 
victory was widely considered as a victory of the relatively more radical wing over the moderates. 
The leadership change led to a split-off by Lucke supporters and constituted the beginning of a 
substantial change of the AfD’s policy platform, illustrating the relevance of the leadership 
position for the study of party politics (Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015). 
                                                          
1 There are several terms for right-wing populist parties in circulation. This paper uses the broad terms “right-wing” 
and “populist,” as a focus on national identities (right-wing) and an anti-establishment appeal (populist) are the 
defining characteristics of this party family (Rydgren, 2007: 243-246). 
2 
 
Prima facie, the AfD appeared to experience the same internal process that occurred in 
previous attempts to establish a right-to-the-center party in Germany and elsewhere: Initial 
electoral successes attracted radical activists, while potential social sanctions associated with being 
a member of a right-wing populist party induced moderates to stay away, eventually pushing the 
party further to the right (Art, 2011; Kitschelt, 1995: 237-239). The literature highlights that intra-
party conflicts between radical and moderate factions are a major internal supply factor for the 
failure of right-wing populist parties (Mudde, 2007: 270-273). Klandermans and Mayer (2005) 
find that activists of such parties are often more radical than right-wing voters. Activists of niche 
parties, such as right-wing populist parties, tend to be ideologically motivated and attempts by the 
party leadership to moderate the programmatic appeal could provoke intra-party conflicts (Adams 
et al., 2006: 515). Particularly, this is the case if such parties enter a government coalition that 
requires moderation (Akkerman and De Lange, 2012: 581). The conflicts between moderate 
leadership and radical activists within the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) led to the collapse of two 
governing coalitions in 1986 and 2002 (Heinisch, 2003). In addition, niche parties that start out 
with a single issue, as in the case of the AfD with the euro crisis, are likely to face internal division 
over the expansion of the policy platform (Lynch et al., 2012). 
This paper analyzes the internal conflict of the AfD at the grassroot level. I argue that 
programmatic differences do not sufficiently explain the outcome of the leadership contest; an 
organizational reform and selective exposure on social media were key factors that made 
supporters abandon Lucke. First, Lucke pursued an organization reform to centralize power, 
effectively promoting an organizational structure similar to mainstream parties. But such a reform 
was too early in the party’s life cycle, which was established on anti-party sentiments and grassroot 
involvement in internal affairs (Abedi and Lundberg 2009). The organization reform created a 
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conflict between Lucke and the rank-and-file activists who wanted to preserve the existing 
structure. Second, Lucke did not actively embrace social media to woo supporters, and his 
opponents dominated alternative news outlets on Facebook. The Lucke-critical messages were 
likely to be more persuasive for AfD supporters who were dissatisfied with the mainstream media, 
because the mistrust motivated them to seek out non-traditional news sources online. 
This paper utilizes the advertising option ‘Facebook ads’ of the social media platform 
Facebook to obtain panel data of AfD supporters. Supporters of the AfD were invited via Facebook 
ads to an online questionnaire in September 2013 before the German national election, and the 
same participants were surveyed again in July 2015 on the party’s leadership dispute. The panel 
appears to be representative of the party’s political attitudes, as it approximates the outcomes of 
an online party referendum and correctly captured Petry’s 3-to-2 victory over Lucke. The panel 
provides insights into the attitudes of AfD supporters over time, which is unprecedented in the 
study of party organizations. 
The empirical analysis shows that there were only minor programmatic differences 
between Petry and Lucke voters in 2013, which became more pronounced at the time of the 2015 
leadership contest. Even when controlling for these programmatic convictions from both samples, 
activists were more likely to support Petry. In addition, social media consumption of supporters 
who were dissatisfied with real-world democracy was significantly associated with voting for 
Petry. The model estimates a Lucke victory in the leadership contest in the scenario of low political 
activism or low social media consumption. 
The article begins with a discussion of the AfD and the programmatic differences between 
the Petry and Lucke factions, followed by the introduction of the non-programmatic hypotheses to 
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explain Petry’s victory. The next section introduces the sample process, describes the data, and 
conducts the empirical analysis. The conclusion summarizes the findings and discusses the 
implications for studying the internal politics of right-wing populist parties. 
 
2. The leadership contest over the programmatic orientation of the AfD 
The AfD was established months before the 2013 national election, in which it received 
4.7 percent, barely missing the 5-percent threshold for parliamentary representation. The AfD’s 
main campaign issue was the euro crisis; it rejected the bailout measures and proposed a reform of 
the Eurozone. 
The AfD mostly appealed to conservative and market-liberal voters who were disgruntled 
by the euro bailout policies of Merkel’s governing coalition of the Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU) and the Free Democrats (FDP). Former members of radical right-wing parties or 
organizations that were observed by the Verfassungsschutz (federal or state offices for the 
Protection of the Constitution) were not allowed to join. Quantitative and qualitative evidence 
suggests that the AfD did not qualify as a right-wing populist party at this stage (Schmitt-Beck, 
2017: 144): AfD candidates for the 2013 national election tended to have a market-liberal 
orientation (Jankowski et al., 2017). Arzheimer (2015a) finds that the soft Eurosceptic 
programmatic positions of the AfD 2014 European election manifesto closely resembled the CSU 
– the Bavarian sister party of Merkel’s Christian Democrats. 
The AfD received 7.1 percent in the European Parliament election of 25 May 2014 and 10-
12 percent in the three East-German state elections of Saxony, Brandenburg, and Thuringia in 
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autumn 2014. Subsequently, however, the party descended into a month-long internal conflict. 
AfD frontrunner and co-leader Lucke wanted to solidify the AfD as a moderate center-right party 
(Goerres et al., 2018: 248). The national-conservative wing of the party rejected these plans, as 
they wanted to establish the AfD as a principled opposition party. They criticized Lucke for his 
support of the trade agreement TTIP with the United States, and for voting for sanctions against 
Russia in the EU parliament – which violated a party resolution that rejected sanctions. Another 
major source of conflict was the relationship with the anti-Islam movement Pegida (Patriotic 
Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West). Pegida’s weekly street protests peaked at about 
25,000 participants in the city of Dresden and the federal state of Saxony in early 2015, but failed 
to draw sizeable support in the Western parts of Germany (Dostal, 2015). Patzelt and Klose (2016) 
find that Pegida participants overwhelmingly supported the AfD. Lucke wanted to distance the 
AfD from the Pegida movement, while local AfD leaders called for a closer cooperation with 
Pegida.  
Björn Höcke, the party leader of Thuringia, established the informal faction Der Flügel 
(The Wing) and published the “Erfurt Resolution,” which attacked Lucke’s leadership and 
programmatic positions. It demanded that the AfD should be “a principled patriotic and democratic 
alternative to the established parties” that becomes a “resistance movement against the continued 
erosion of Germany’s sovereignty and identity.” The Erfurt Resolution was signed by about 2,000 
members. Lucke and his supporters responded with the “Germany Resolution” and the formal club 
Der Weckruf (The Wake-Up Call). Weckruf was joined by about 4,000 supporters, and warned that 
the AfD would turn into a radical sectarian party without Lucke. 
Opponents of Lucke rallied behind Petry, the second leader of the party, who successfully 
challenged Lucke for leadership at the national party convention in July 2015. Petry was initially 
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an ally of Lucke, but broke with him once she had enough support to overthrow him. Lucke and 
his followers left the AfD to establish the Alliance for Progress and Renewal (Alfa), which was 
later rebranded as Liberal Conservative Reformers (LKR). Petry’s victory led to a programmatic 
repositioning of the AfD towards a more national conservative platform (Jankowski et al., 2017: 
714). The AfD fell to 3 percent in national polls directly after the leadership dispute in August 
2015. The AfD strongly opposed Merkel’s controversial refugee policy, which eventually paved 
the way into national parliament after receiving 12.6 percent in the 2017 national election. 
Petry launched an attempt to expel Höcke from the party in January 2017 after he gave a 
speech demanding a 180 degree change in Germany’s politics of commemoration, leading to a 
new intra-party conflict between Petry supporters and the national-conservatives. Petry was not 
nominated as frontrunner for the 2017 national election. As a consequence of her dwindling 
influence, Petry left the AfD directly after the national election to establish Die blaue Partei (The 
Blue Party). Sharing the fate of Lucke’s LKR, Petry’s Blue Party has failed to draw any 
considerable support so far.  
 
3. Non-programmatic explanations for the outcome of the leadership contest 
3.1 The AfD’s organization life cycle mismatch 
Prior research links the survival of party leaders with electoral performance and securing 
government positions, as internal competitors would rather strategically associate themselves with 
a successful leader to gain favors instead of seeking an unfavorable confrontation. Consequently, 
intra-party conflicts over the leadership tend to become more likely in general if intra-party 
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factions can blame the leadership for electoral losses (Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015; Greene 
and Haber, 2016: 614). 
By contrast, Abedi and Lundberg (2009) argue that internal conflicts over the leadership 
could be more likely after rapid electoral gains in the case of right-wing populist organizations. 
The populist appeal also applies to their organizational structure, which often emphasizes intra-
party democracy. This organizational structure is beneficial in the beginning of a party’s life cycle 
to develop an identity and attract motivated activists. Vote-seeking strategies become more 
dominant at the second stage. Electoral successes lead to higher membership numbers and 
parliamentary representation, which require organizational reform that institutionalizes 
administrative processes and fosters the effectiveness of parliamentary work. At the third stage, 
the strategies switch to office-seeking, which requires that the party establishes relationships with 
other parties and develops a reputation of being a serious coalition partner in order to gain access 
to government positions. Such changes are likely to require organizational centralization. 
Using UKIP as a case study, Abedi and Lundberg (2009) illustrate that intra-party conflicts 
between the leadership and rank-and-file activists are likely to emerge if a leader wants to pursue 
an organizational reform too early in the life cycle of a right-wing populist party after an electoral 
breakthrough. The disparity between leaders and activists as a consequence of a life cycle 
mismatch is connected to Robert Michels’ (1915) seminal Iron Law of Oligarchy. According to 
the Iron Law, the leadership is more willing to adopt a vote maximization strategy in order to 
acquire public offices. By contrast, activists tend to care more about the purity of party principles 
than office-seeking strategies. Their ideological convictions and dissatisfaction with the status quo 
motivate them to participate relatively more often in unpaid campaigning and canvassing for the 
party, leading to a disparity of preferences between leaders and rank-and-file activists. 
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In the case of the AfD, the support for direct democracy indeed transcended to the 
organizational structure. As described by Reiser (2018), the AfD adopted participatory means for 
their internal affairs to differ from mainstream parties. The party had an unusual joint leadership 
with three co-leaders. Members were invited to vote on party programs and election manifestos in 
online referenda. The party congresses were frequently open to all members. 
It is likely that AfD activists were disgruntled with Lucke, as the internal divide over the 
programmatic orientation of the AfD coincided with a conflict over the organizational structure. 
Lucke wanted to replace the joint leadership structure consisting of three leaders with him as single 
leader. This charter reform provoked stiff resistance from other party leaders at the end of 2014 
(Arzheimer, 2015a: 552). A compromise was passed at the party’s charter congress on January 31, 
2015. The leadership structure was temporarily reduced to a dual leadership, which was supposed 
to be turned into a single leadership by the end of the year after another party congress would have 
adopted an official party manifesto. While the charter reform was generally considered as a victory 
for Lucke by the media, some reports highlight that this was a “lonely victory” for Lucke, as he 
aggravated many of his supporters (Schneider, 2015).  
In fact, Lucke opponents implicitly evoked the Iron Law of Oligarchy against Lucke’s 
charter reform and programmatic orientation. Höcke’s Erfurt Resolution warned that the AfD is in 
jeopardy to be turned into a “technocratic oriented” party that unnecessarily restricts the diversity 
of opinions for the career aspirations of the leadership. Petry also incorporated the organizational 
aspect into her campaign. Her campaign ran under the slogan “gemeinsam statt einsam” (together 
instead of alone), criticizing Lucke for ignoring the rank-and-file and allegedly turning the AfD 
into a second CDU. A campaign video of Petry showed a montage of Lucke repeatedly saying “I”, 
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which is followed by a montage of various rank-and-file members, party leaders, and Petry saying 
“we”.  
The discussion suggests that Lucke pursued an organizational reform that did not match 
the life cycle of the AfD, provoking resistance from the rank-and-file activists. The life cycle 
mismatch gives rise to the following hypothesis: 
Activists Hypothesis (H1): Political activists were more likely to support Petry in the 
leadership contest. 
 
3.2 The conditional impact of social media on intra-party opinion formation 
Scholars increasingly investigate how political information disseminated at social media 
platforms, such as Facebook or Twitter, affect political behavior and participation. Prior research 
suggests that the effect of social media on political opinion formation is not straightforward but 
contingent on other factors. In the case of perceived election fraud in Russia, awareness was only 
positively associated with social media usage for users who accessed networking platforms that 
were politicized by the opposition (Reuter and Szakonyi, 2015), and who were already critical of 
the government (Robertson, 2017). Thus, social media users who were not exposed to critical 
information or did not consider critical information as trustworthy, had no reason to believe that 
electoral fraud occurred. 
 I argue that two similar conditions – message intensity and regime satisfaction – are 
relevant for the opinion formation of right-wing supporters on social media platforms: 
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First, the literature on campaigning highlights that campaign effects are pronounced if a 
campaign message is frequently received by voters and if the message remains unchallenged by 
opposing campaigns, which suggests that voters are not familiar with alternative narratives (Zaller, 
1992; Kriesi, 2002). Similarly, it is likely that intense and one-sided messages by opinion leaders 
on social media have the strongest influence on followers.   
Second, regime satisfaction refers to the subjective satisfaction of real-world democratic 
processes. This includes the belief that votes are counted fairly, that freedom of speech and other 
human rights are protected, that the media is impartial, and that no party is disadvantaged by the 
political system. Social media users with low regime satisfaction are supposed to be less likely to 
consider mainstream stories shared by friends or well-established private media broadcasts on 
social media as trustworthy, while they are more likely to be motivated to seek out information of 
alternative news outlets or find alternative news stories trustworthy. Past studies show that at least 
AfD voters have low trust in political institutions and the mainstream media (Goerres et al., 2018). 
Thus, intense and one-sided messages on social media will not affect users if they mistrust the 
source. 
The network analysis tool “Facebook insights” shows that the AfD had a dispersed network 
structure of different opinion leaders on Facebook in July 2015.2 Among the 100.000 to 150.000 
monthly active Facebook fans, the official party page had the largest audience with 51,800. The 
party leaders Petry and Lucke only had a reach of 12,900 each. Non-party actors had a higher reach 
within the AfD network, such as the Pegida movement (32,500), or the pro-Russian news outlets 
                                                          
2 Facebook is the predominant social media platform in Germany. In the case of the official AfD page, Facebook likes 
(122,000) exceed Twitter followers (9,600) by over 12 times as of July 2014 (Arzheimer, 2015a: 548). 
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Russia Today (RT) (22,400) and Sputnik (13,400), and the newspaper Junge Freiheit (JF) 
(22,100),  
 Whereas Petry and her supporters actively used social media for intra-party campaigning, 
Lucke abstained from actively engaging in campaigning on social media, as he considered such a 
behavior to undermine his reputation in the long run.3 Most of Lucke’s entries on his Facebook 
page were comments on policies and events predominantly concerning the euro crisis with further 
links to stories by major German newspapers, while avoiding alternative news outlets completely. 
Most traditional news outlets echoed Lucke’s argumentation, claiming that the AfD would suffer 
an exit of moderate forces and a downfall like the German Republicans after a Petry victory 
(Wessendorf, 2015). 
On the official AfD Facebook page, Lucke had the most entries of all major AfD politicians 
in the month before the leadership contest. However, the frequency of entries by pro-Petry and 
pro-Lucke politicians were exactly equal4, and all Lucke entries resembled press releases in which 
he commented on policy issues. By contrast, Petry and her supporters posted campaign messages 
in the days before the leadership contest. The page administration even deleted posts supporting 
Lucke’s Weckruf and banned pro-Lucke users from the page – a measure that the party committee 
repealed on June 9, 2015 prompted by Lucke. 
 The JF is the largest right-wing newspaper in Germany and it has supported the 
establishment of the AfD. In the leadership contest, the JF interviewed both sides and took a rather 
                                                          
3 Based on interviews with former supporters and an associate of Lucke. 
4 Entries by AfD politicians who supported Lucke in the leadership contest: Lucke (13), Henkel (3), Kölmel (2), 
Starbatty (2). Entries by politicians who supported Petry: Adam (8), Petry (6), Gauland (4), von Storch (2). 
Arzheimer’s (2015b) keyword-based shows that Lucke’s name and agenda appeared the most often in AfD Facebook 
posts before the leadership contest, but topics championed by Lucke opponents, such as immigration and criticism of 
Islam, aroused more comments by users visiting the AfD fan page. 
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neutral position, emphasizing that a Lucke split-off and a radicalization endanger the electoral 
prospect of the party (Stein, 2015). Pegida, RT, and Sputnik did not comment on the AfD, but they 
were indirectly involved in the leadership contest as Lucke rejected any association of the AfD 
with Pegida and supported a pro-Western foreign policy. In general, Neuerer (2015) describes 
Facebook as a key “battle instrument” in the campaign for the leadership contest. Particularly, 
Lucke supporters complained about the fierce debates, accusations and insults on Facebook. They 
perceived that “fake news” about Lucke on Facebook persuaded many previous Lucke supporters 
to opt for Petry in the leadership contest.5 
The analysis of opinion leaders in the AfD’s social media network reveals that the pro-
Petry message dominated alternative news, while the mainstream media tended to portray Lucke 
more favorable who also shared their stories. The discrepancy between pro-Lucke and pro-Petry 
messages suggests that the effect of social media on political opinion formation is not 
straightforward but conditional on trust and self-selection to stories. Social media users with low 
regime satisfaction are less likely to consider mainstream stories shared by Lucke as trustworthy, 
while they are more likely to be motivated to seek out information of alternative news outlets or 
to find such stories trustworthy. 
 This discussion leads to the following conditional social-media hypothesis: 
 Social-Media Hypothesis (H2): Social media users who had a low regime satisfaction 
were more likely to support Petry, while social media users with high regime satisfaction were 
more likely to support Lucke. 
                                                          
5 Based on interviews with former supporters and an associate of Lucke. 
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4. Empirical section 
4.1 Sampling procedure 
A sample of AfD supporters was obtained by using the advertising option of the social 
media webpage Facebook. Facebook ads runs small advertising boxes for a selected target 
population. The researcher determines the target population by choosing a list of relevant fan pages 
for the political party of interest. Facebook Ads provides summary statistics about the aggregate 
demographics for the target population and specified subgroups. Thus, potential biases are 
tractable in advance and can be accounted for by imposing demographic-related quotas for age, 
education, or gender. Jäger (2017) provides a detailed description of the procedure. Previous 
studies suggest that Facebook sampling can be used to generate a representative sample of hard-
to-reach population, particularly as it allows for pre-sample quotas and a large sample size, which 
in turn makes post-stratification weights more reliable for samples of voters (Samuels and Zucco, 
2014) or party members or supporters (Jäger, 2017). 
 Shortly before the 2013 German national election, Facebook Ads were used to invite fans 
of the official fan pages of the AfD and Lucke to an online questionnaire in German between 10 
and 22 September 2013. The sampling procedure was based on six advertising campaigns to ensure 
equal sampling quotas for the six age groups 18 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 59, and 
60 years and older.6 The sample consists of 1,254 AfD supporters who voted for the AfD. 658 of 
them stated that they would participate in future surveys, of which 31.8 percent or 209 participated 
in the survey of July 2015 shortly before and after the leadership contest. The answers of each 
participant from both waves were matched. The resulting panel allows us to evaluate to which 
                                                          
6 Appendix A shows the advertisement boxes and the summary statistics of the sampling process. 
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extent AfD supporters from the 2013 sample, who stated that they would vote for Petry in 2015 
differ from those supporting Lucke on various items from the 2013 and 2015 samples. 
 Concerning the representativeness of the sampling method, the second wave of AfD 
supporters accurately reflected intra-party decisions of the party (Jäger, 2017: 333-336). AfD 
members were invited to vote on the party’s manifesto for the European Parliamentary election in 
an online referendum between 19 and 28 February 2014. The estimates of the panel coincide with 
the results of the intra-party referendum for items with similar questions. In the online referendum, 
97.6 percent supported the introduction of national referenda. The result was 98.9 percent for AfD 
supporters who participated in the 2015 survey. Regarding the support for introducing gender 
quotas and for gender mainstreaming, a small minority of 4.6 and 12.1 percent in the online 
referendum, and 2.4 and 9.7 percent in the Facebook sample agreed with these policies. The 
similarity also occurred for issues that were closely contested within the AfD. In the online party 
referendum, a narrow majority of 52.6 percent rejected the idea of a minimum wage law. The 
estimated rejection is with 55.1 percent only slightly higher in the Facebook sample. 40.1 percent 
supported TTIP in the referendum, while 45.8 percent of respondents had a positive impression on 
the United States in the Facebook sample. The 95-percent confidence intervals for the estimates 
of these items are overlapping, suggesting that they are statistically indistinguishable from each 
other.  
The estimates of 2015 sample for the leadership contest are also statistically 
indistinguishable at the 95-percent confidence level from the actual proportion of Petry’s victory. 
Petry received 56.8 percent among AfD supporters in the survey, closely resembling the 61.1 
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percent of the actual leadership contest.7 The comparisons indicate that the panel data of AfD 
supporters is representative of the AfD membership at least in terms of key political attitudes. 
 
4.2 Data description 
The empirical analysis evaluates which factors can explain Petry’s victory in the leadership 
contest. The binomial dependent variable is the vote choice of Petry over Lucke from the 2015 
sample. In addition, participants were asked how much they like Petry and Lucke on a scale from 
0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). The sympathy difference of liking Petry over Lucke can 
range from -10 to 10, and is an alternative dependent variable. 
The main explanatory variables are from the 2013 sample. An index of Political Activism 
is relevant for the Activists Hypothesis. It is generated by using the average score of the six survey 
items “putting up political posters,” “handing out political flyers,” “attending political 
demonstrations or rallies,” “attending political party meetings,” “donating money to a party,” and 
“canvassing voters on behalf of the party.” Respondents were asked how often they perform these 
activities. There were four answer options ranging from “never” to “often.”  
The interaction term between regime satisfaction and social media consumption is relevant 
for the Social-Media Hypothesis. Regime Satisfaction is measured by the average score on the 
seven survey items “votes are counted fairly,” “TV news favors the governing party” (reversed), 
“journalists provide fair coverage of elections,” “everyone enjoys freedom of opinion,” “human 
rights are protected,” “some parties are seriously hampered in their election campaigns” (reversed), 
                                                          
7 Appendix Table B1 shows the comparison of these different items in tabular form. 
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and “Germany is governed democratically,”. There were five answer options ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The dichotomous variable Social Media equals one if 
respondents chose “online social networks (Facebook, Twitter)” on the survey item “which media 
sources do you frequently use to acquire political information.” 
The following variables from the 2013 sample capture ideological convictions and 
programmatic positions on topics that were salient for AfD supporters: Restricting Immigration is 
based on the average score on three survey items that asked how many immigrants from different 
groups (same ethnic group, other ethnic group, from poor countries outside Europe) should be 
allowed to come to Germany. There were four answer options ranging from “many” to “none.” 
Leave EU is based on survey items that asked whether respondents want Germany to leave the EU. 
Reduce Income Inequality and Support Free Trade are based on the statement “the government 
should take measures to reduce differences in income” and “Germany benefits from free trade.” 
Respondents could choose options ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Like 
Russia is based on a sympathy score for Russia from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). 
Related programmatic items from the 2015 survey that were salient in the intra-party 
dispute are Like Pegida, Support TTIP, and Support Russia-Sanctions. Like Pegida measures how 
much respondents like Pegida on a scale from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like). The 
respondents were also asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statements: 
“Germany would benefit from the planned free trade agreement TTIP between the EU and USA,” 
and “the economic sanctions against Russia are appropriate and should continue.”  
The next control variable is Seeking Political Career, which is based on the average score 
on two items asking whether respondents engage “not at all,” “a little bit,” or “a lot” in politics in 
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order to achieve party positions and to become a politician. Professional considerations are 
captured by the variables Social Status, which is based on the subjective status ranging from 0 
(lowest status) to 10 (highest status), and four dummy variables: High Position (lawyer, doctor, 
blue- and white-collar worker with executive tasks, and high-ranked civil servants), Civil Servant 
(civil servants of all ranks, soldiers, and police officers), Self-Employed (professionals with an own 
business), and Not Working (unemployed, retirees, housewives). Further control variables are AfD 
Member, Age, Education Level, Female, and East German. All control variables are from the 2013 
survey. 
<<< TABLE 1 >>> 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables, and t-tests of means for differences 
between Petry and Lucke voters. As suggested by the Activists Hypothesis, Petry voters were 
significantly more politically active relative to Lucke voters. Petry voters were also significantly 
less satisfied with democratic processes in Germany.8 Significant programmatic differences did 
not exist for the 2013 items. For items from the 2015 sample, significant differences occurred for 
liking Pegida, supporting TTIP, and sanctions against Russia. In total, there were 77 and 11 
programmatic survey items in the 2013 and 2015 samples. Petry and Lucke voters differed 
significantly from each other on 8 (10.4%) and 9 (81.8%) of these items, demonstrating that 
programmatic differences within the AfD were minor in 2013, but became pronounced over time.9 
AfD supporters who did not work or were from East Germany were more likely to favor Petry. 
                                                          
8 The collinearity between the key explanatory variables does not appear to be strong. The correlation of Political 
Activism is -0.127 with Regime Satisfaction and 0.057 with Social Media. The value is 0.07 for Regime Satisfaction 
and Social Media. Additionally, there is not a strong correlation between the key explanatory variables and the 
ideological positions. 
9 Appendix Tables B2 and B3 show the descriptive statistics and a t-test of means for Petry and Lucke voters for all 
programmatic survey items. 
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<<< FIGURE 1 >>> 
Figure 1 shows the self-placement of respondents on a left-right dimension for placement 
items from the 2013 and 2015 samples. Petry and Lucke supporter did not differ significantly from 
each other on the four dimensions economic policy-making, way of life, identity, and EU asked in 
2013. But Lucke supporters placed themselves on average at the center (5.05), while Petry 
supporters situated themselves at the center-right (6.8) in the 2015 sample. The placement by both 
groups of the average AfD member is statistically indistinguishable from each other. Petry 
supporters placed Lucke significantly further to the left, suggesting that they perceived a stronger 
polarization between groups. Furthermore, Lucke supporters tended to situate the average AfD 
member closer to Petry (distance of 0.725) than to Lucke (distance of 1.775), which shows that 
even his followers thought that Lucke’s policy position was relatively less representative of the 
party’s majority.  
 
4.3 Empirical Analysis 
Table 2 shows the empirical results for five different models. Model 1 is based on the variables 
relevant for the hypotheses and the control variables. Model 2 includes the 2013 programmatic 
variables, and model 3 adds the 2015 programmatic variables. Model 4 is the main model with all 
variables. Including the programmatic variables increases the difficulty level to confirm the 
hypotheses, because any effect by political activism or social media on political attitudes over time 
will be absorbed by the programmatic variables. As the dependent variable is dichotomous, the 
empirical analysis is based on a binomial logistic regression model with robust standard errors for 
models 1-4. Model 5 is based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis with robust 
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standard errors as the dichotomous dependent variable is replaced with the like-difference variable 
as a robustness test.10 
<<< TABLE 2 >>> 
When included, Political Activism is significantly positive at the 95-percent confidence 
interval across all model specifications, providing evidence for the Activists Hypothesis. The 
interaction term between social media and regime satisfaction is significantly negative at the 95-
percent confidence interval in all model specification when included, as suggested by the Social-
Media Hypothesis. Among the programmatic variables, liking Pegida was significantly associated 
with voting for Petry, while respondents supporting TTIP were significantly more likely to opt for 
Lucke. Among the professional career variables, non-working supporters were significantly more 
likely to vote for Petry. The results look similar for explaining like differences between Petry and 
Lucke in model 5. 
<<< FIGURE 2 >>> 
The coefficients of the logistic regression analyses do not show directly how strongly they 
influence the dependent variable. As a consequence, I use the Stata-package Clarify to convert the 
estimates into predicted probabilities in order to improve the substantial interpretation of the 
findings (King et al., 2000; Tomz et al., 2003). Figure 2 shows the change of the predicted 
probability if the significant explanatory variables are separately moved from their mean to one 
standard deviation above while keeping all other explanatory variables at their mean. Such a 
                                                          
10 Appendix B consists of further robustness tests, in which the programmatic variables are based on respondents’ 
position on several ideological dimensions. Additionally, the measurement of social media discounts for TV 
consumption (Appendix Table B4). Finally, the average score of the index variables is replaced with factor scores 
(Appendix Table B5). Appendix Tables B6 and B7 show the descriptive statistics of the index composites and the 
principal factor analysis. 
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change in Political Activism increases the probability of voting for Petry by about 14.7 percent. 
Among the other variables, the estimated substantial impact is the highest for liking Pegida 
(24.7%). 
<<< FIGURE 3 >>> 
Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of Social Media while Regime Satisfaction is kept at 
alternating values, which is relevant for the Social-Media Hypothesis. When regime satisfaction is 
set at two (one) standard deviations below its mean, social media consumption significantly 
increases the probability of voting for Petry by 60.3 (45.6) percent. The estimated probabilities are 
significant at the 99-percent confidence level. When regime satisfaction is kept at its mean, the 
probability for opting for Petry stands at 18.5 percent, but barely misses the 90-percent confidence 
interval. The probability for voting for Lucke becomes positive with 11.0 (29.7) percent when 
regime satisfaction is kept at one (two) standard deviation(s) above its mean, but is only significant 
at the 90-percent confidence level in the latter scenario. 
The empirical analysis shows that programmatic differences between Petry and Lucke 
voters were negligible in 2013, but became more pronounced over time. Particularly, support for 
Pegida was an important intra-party fault line during the leadership contest. As suggested by the 
hypotheses, political activism and the selective exposure on social media were crucial factors for 
the dwindling support for Lucke. While the average probability for a Petry-vote was 61.7 percent, 
it increases to 81.7 percent if activism was one standard deviation above its mean and regime 
satisfaction was a standard deviation below its mean. If political activism (or social media 
consumption) was kept at its minimum, the average probability for a Lucke-vote increases to 56.0 
(52.5) percent, thus predicting a Lucke victory.   
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5. Conclusion 
The newly established AfD was the first right-to-the-center party to pass the 5-percent threshold 
for parliamentary representation in a national election in Germany. What preceded the electoral 
breakthrough was a crucial intra-party conflict: Petry’s victory over Lucke in the leadership contest 
of July 2015 led to the defection of a large portion of moderates and to a programmatic shift of the 
AfD to the right. Panel data of AfD supporters provide a unique insight into the fault lines of the 
internal divide. 
This study shows that initial programmatic differences between Petry and Lucke voters 
were negligible in 2013 but became pronounced at the time of the leadership contest, showing that 
polarization grew over time within the AfD. Politically active supporters and social media users 
with low regime satisfaction were significantly more likely to vote for Petry, while controlling for 
programmatic convictions from both sample waves. The relevance of activism and social media 
were fostered by two distinctive features of the AfD. First, Lucke was perceived by disgruntled 
supporters to pursue an organizational reform to increase his power at the expense of the rank-and-
file activists. Second, the influence of Lucke in the Facebook network of AfD supporters was 
relatively small. In contrast to his opponents, he did not actively use social media for campaigning 
apart from sharing mainstream news stories that only appealed to supporters with prior trust in the 
mainstream media. 
It is thus unlikely that these factors have an identical effect on internal dynamics of right-
wing populist parties across Europe, which often have a strong leader actively utilizing social 
media to communicate with voters and supporters. Nonetheless, there are two wider implications 
for right-wing political parties. 
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First, populist strategies might help right-wing parties to gain voters and committed 
activists, but such successes eventually put pressure on the organization to centralize and 
institutionalize decision-making processes. Attempts by the leadership to initiate organizational 
reforms could drive a wedge between the leadership and activists if a challenger for the leadership 
emerges who can successfully appeal to disaffected activists by campaigning on protecting intra-
party democracy. 
Second, right-wing populist parties increasingly rely on social media to communicate with 
supporters. Subjective dissatisfaction about real-world democracy and distrust in mainstream 
media are relatively more common in right-wing networks. Prior research highlights that social 
media platforms often function as echo chambers in which users join groups of like-minded people 
and perceive selected information based on their own worldviews. The confirmation bias of users 
to promote their favorite stories contribute to information cascades while dissenting narratives – 
regardless of their validity – are often ignored, reinforcing the polarization of political groups (Del 
Vicario et al., 2006; Quattrociocchi et al., 2016). Consequently, alternative news sources are likely 
to play an important role in the opinion formation of right-wing supporters as well as in internal 
affairs of right-wing parties. Focusing on social media content, the relative influence of party 
leaders, and the structure of social media networks could improve our understanding of intra-party 
dynamics of right-wing populist parties and possibly of other party families as well.  
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Figure 1. Positions by Petry and Lucke supporters in political space 
Note: Error bars give the 95-percent confidence interval. Black entries refer to the 2013 sample, grey entries to the 
2015 sample. 
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Figure 2. Simulated substantial impact on the probability of voting for Petry 
Note: Simulation is based on Table 2, model 4. Error bars give the 90-percent confidence interval. An explanatory 
variable is changed from its mean to one standard deviation above while holding all other explanatory variables at 
their mean. 
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Figure 3. Simulated substantial impact of social media conditional on regime satisfaction 
Note: Simulation is based on Table 2, model 4. Error bars give the 90-percent confidence interval. The interaction 
term and social media consumption are changed based on moving social media consumption from 0 to 1 and regime 
satisfaction is kept constant at five different stages. All other explanatory variables are held at their mean. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for AfD supporters 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Petry 
Voters 
Lucke 
Voters 
Vote Petry2015 185 0.568 0.497 0 1   
Like Difference: Petry over 
Lucke2015 
185 0.557 6.108 -10 10 4.962 -5.225 
Political Activism 181 1.834 0.753 1 3.833 1.942 1.688 
Social Media 185 0.811 0.393 0 1 0.838 0.775 
Regime Satisfaction 183 2.704 0.757 1.143 5 2.558 2.897 
Restricting Immigration 183 2.454 0.613 1 4 2.519 2.367 
Leave EU 184 3.076 1.552 1 5 3.269 2.825 
Reduce Income Inequality 184 2.908 1.200 1 5 2.951 2.850 
Support Free Trade 184 3.652 0.957 1 5 3.606 3.713 
Like Russia 185 4.897 2.818 0 10 5.152 4.563 
Like Pegida 2015 184 5.793 3.193 0 10 7.144 4.038 
Support TTIP2015 184 2 1.145 1 5 1.686 2.418 
Support Russia-Sanctions2015 184 2 1.310 1 5 1.638 2.481 
Seeking Political Career 184 1.459 0.603 1 3 1.443 1.481 
Social Status 185 5.735 1.591 1 10 5.543 5.988 
High Position 185 0.157 0.365 0 1 0.143 0.175 
Civil Servant 185 0.070 0.256 0 1 0.076 0.063 
Self-Employed 185 0.265 0.442 0 1 0.267 0.263 
Not Working 185 0.086 0.282 0 1 0.133 0.025 
AfD Member 183 0.290 0.455 0 1 0.298 0.278 
Age 185 42.33 13.181 18 72 43.029 41.413 
Education Level 185 5.357 2.065 1 9 5.295 5.438 
Female 184 0.103 0.305 0 1 0.087 0.125 
East German 185 0.195 0.397 0 1 0.276 0.088 
Note: East German includes Berlin. Bold entries indicate that entries are significantly higher based on a 95-percent 
confidence level.  
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Table 2. Regression analyses explaining Petry-vote (Models 1-4) and like differences (Model 5) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
H1: Political Activism 0.96*** 
(2.67) 
  0.97** 
(2.23) 
1.61** 
(2.39) 
H2: Interaction Term  
Regime Satisfaction * Social Media 
-1.32** 
(2.32) 
  -1.77** 
(2.50) 
-2.59** 
(2.31) 
Social Media 3.78** 
(2.44) 
  5.56*** 
(2.70) 
7.17** 
(2.34) 
Regime Satisfaction 0.51 
(1.03) 
  1.54** 
(2.30) 
1.96* 
(1.89) 
Restricting Immigration  0.31 
(1.09) 
-0.17 
(0.43) 
-0.25 
(0.58) 
-0.33 
(0.41) 
Leave EU  0.14 
(1.08) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.48) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
Reduce Income Inequality  -0.10 
(0.59) 
-0.18 
(0.99) 
-0.29 
(1.46) 
-0.52 
(1.47) 
Support Free Trade  -0.19 
(0.96) 
0.11 
(0.33) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
0.15 
(0.33) 
Like Russia  0.03 
(0.49) 
-0.05 
(0.65) 
-0.04 
(0.41) 
-0.20 
(1.27) 
Like Pegida 2015   0.41*** 
(4.56) 
0.44*** 
(4.27) 
0.89*** 
(6.46) 
Support TTIP2015   0.54*** 
(2.68) 
-0.47** 
(2.10) 
-0.65* 
(1.73) 
Support Russia-Sanctions2015   -0.35* 
(1.81) 
-0.34 
(1.57) 
-0.97** 
(2.55) 
Seeking Political Career -0.38 
(1.17) 
-0.49 
(1.62) 
-0.51 
(1.39) 
-0.73* 
(1.73) 
-1.49** 
(2.16) 
Social Status -0.12 
(0.95) 
-0.12 
(0.94) 
-0.12 
(0.85) 
-0.11 
(0.72) 
-0.34 
(1.36) 
High Position 0.53 
(0.91) 
0.31 
(0.59) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.37 
(0.46) 
-0.27 
(0.20) 
Civil Servant 0.53 
(0.87) 
0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.87 
(0.44) 
Self-Employed 0.81* 
(1.72) 
0.53 
(1.20) 
0.88 
(1.50) 
1.29* 
(1.88) 
1.68* 
(1.71) 
Not Working 2.99** 
(2.47) 
2.65** 
(2.54) 
3.08*** 
(3.19) 
3.50*** 
(2.63) 
2.75* 
(1.88) 
AfD Member -1.00* 
(1.90) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.89 
(1.18) 
-0.41 
(0.35) 
Age -0.01 
(0.56) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.81) 
-0.03 
(1.11) 
-0.07 
(1.65) 
Education Level -0.04 
(0.46) 
-0.03 
(0.27) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.28 
(1.14) 
Female -1.12* 
(1.73) 
-0.86 
(1.36) 
-0.73 
(0.88) 
-1.39 
(1.41) 
-1.17 
(0.68) 
East German 
 
 
1.39** 
(2.52) 
1.72*** 
(3.20) 
1.70*** 
(2.70) 
1.54** 
(2.22) 
1.43 
(1.42) 
Observations 177 178 177 172 172 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1895 0.1389 0.3482 0.3894 0.4740 
Log likelihood -98.01 -105.07 -78.99 -71.78  
Note: *** p≤0.01; ** p≤0.05; * p≤0.1. Absolute Z-values in parentheses. 
31 
 
Appendix A: Summary of Facebook Ads Campaigns 
 
AfD Ad Campaign, 10-22 September 2013 
 
 
Figure A1. Facebook Ads for supporters of the AfD, English translation. 
Note: The header and description were limited to 40 and 90 characters for advertisement on the right column. These 
limits do not apply for Ads on the desktop news feed, allowing for more information about the survey, such as the 
university affiliation.   
 
 
 
Appendix Table A1: Summary statistics of targeted fan pages “Alternative für Deutschland” 
and “Bernd Lucke” 
 
Quotas Cost 
(Euro) 
Impressions Reach Clicks CTR 
(I) 
CTR 
(R) 
Cost 
p. Cl. 
Supporter 
Participation 
Response 
Rate 
Age: 17-24 13.66 557,486 17,368 266 0.05% 1.53% 0.051 131 49.2% 
Age: 25-29 11.84 444,717 9,547 347 0.08% 3.63% 0.034 174 50.1% 
Age: 30-39 12.52 493,907 12,163 394 0.08% 3.24% 0.032 233 59.1% 
Age: 40-49 10.03 439,514 10,318 512 0.12% 4.96% 0.020 349 68.2% 
Age: 50-59 8.06 293,815 6,175 303 0.10% 4.91% 0.027 236 77.9% 
Age: 60+ 4.59 175,473 4,019 206 0.12% 5.13% 0.022 94 45.6% 
Total 60.70 2,404,912 59,590 2,028 0.08% 3.40% 0.030 1,217 60.0% 
Note: CTR: Click-through rate for impressions and reach. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics and robustness tests 
 
Appendix Table B1. Comparing the AfD Facebook sample with actual internal outcomes 
 AfD Members 2015 Sample  
2014 Online Membership referendum    
Support national referenda 
  
97.6% 
[97.1, 98.0] 
 
98.9% 
[97.4, 100] 
 
 
 
Support Gender Quotas  
 
4.6% 
[4.0, 5.2] 
 
2.4% 
[0.1, 4.8] 
 
 
Support Gender Mainstreaming 
 
12.1% 
[11.2, 13.0] 
 
9.7% 
[5.0, 14.4] 
 
 
 
Support Minimum Wage  
 
48.0% 
[46.5, 49.4] 
 
44.9% 
[37.0, 52.8] 
 
 
Support TTIP / Like the USA 
 
40.1% 
[38.7, 41.5] 
 
45.8% 
[37.9, 53.7] 
 
 
2015 National Party Convention    
Support Petry against Lucke  61.1% 
[59.5, 62.8] 
 
56.8% 
[49.6, 64.0] 
 
 
Note: 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Answer options are transformed to fall into the categories “support” and 
“oppose”; “Neither now,” “Neutral,” “Undecided,” or “Don’t know” answers for both surveys are removed. 
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Appendix Table B2. Descriptive statistics of other programmatic items, 2013 sample 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Petry 
Voters 
Lucke 
Voters 
Social Media – (1/2 * TV) 185 0.446 0.436 -0.5 1 0.486 0.394 
Money for the Poor vs. Tax 
Cuts 
185 3.346 1.251 1 5 3.333 3.363 
Economic Growth vs. National 
Culture 
183 3.825 1.070 1 5 3.913 3.709 
Environment vs. Economic 
Growth 
182 3.522 1.086 1 5 3.529 3.513 
Social Stability vs. Personal 
Liberty 
185 3.438 1.041 1 5 3.438 3.438 
Civil Rights vs. Reduce Crime 
Rights 
183 2.951 1.327 1 5 3.058 2.810 
Different gender roles are 
natural 
183 4.016 1.008 1 5 4.125 3.873 
Support Minimum Wage 184 2.859 1.407 1 5 2.875 2.838 
Reduce Government Spending 184 4.332 0.720 1 5 4.298 4.375 
Private enterprise is more 
efficient than state-owned 
183 3.929 1.011 1 5 3.856 4.025 
Subsidies for declining 
industries 
184 2.418 1.093 1 5 2.567 2.225 
Support comprehensive school 185 1.865 1.200 1 5 1.857 1.875 
Smaller Eurozone 185 4.643 0.685 1 5 4.533 4.788 
Special German Responsibility 185 1.870 1.096 1 5 1.714 2.075 
People should provide for 
themselves  
185 2.876 1.180 1 5 2.838 2.925 
Support gender quotas 184 1.478 0.796 1 5 1.4 1.582 
Leave Eurozone 185 3.908 1.036 1 5 3.943 3.863 
Banning minarets 184 4.076 1.303 1 5 4.295 3.784 
Banning Islamic veil 185 4.130 1.287 1 5 4.362 3.825 
Expulsion of criminal 
foreigners 
185 4.804 0.568 1 5 4.819 4.785 
Introducing same-sex marriage 185 2.389 1.507 1 5 2.133 2.725 
Higher taxes for the rich 184 2.734 1.422 1 5 2.762 2.696 
Tariffs for cheap products 185 3.086 1.384 1 5 3.057 3.125 
Nuclear phaseout 185 2.519 1.471 1 5 2.438 2.625 
Justifiable: Using official 
position to help family 
184 2.424 1.252 1 5 2.410 2.443 
Justifiable: Claiming welfare 
without entitlement 
185 1.232 0.537 1 5 1.238 1.225 
Justifiable: Homosexuality 185 3.492 1.364 1 5 3.390 3.625 
Justifiable: Prostitution 185 3.108 1.156 1 5 3.124 3.088 
Justifiable: Abortion 183 3.164 1.345 1 5 3.115 3.228 
Justifiable: Divorce 183 3.940 1.033 1 5 3.835 4.075 
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Justifiable: Soft drugs 185 2.627 1.292 1 5 2.676 2.563 
Justifiable: Parents teach 
obedience 
184 3.908 1.044 1 5 3.894 3.925 
Justifiable: National Pride 184 4.342 0.787 1 5 4.390 4.278 
Justifiable: Sexist jokes 185 3.243 1.147 1 5 3.295 3.175 
Justifiable: Waste energy 184 2.516 1.091 1 5 2.625 2.375 
Justifiable: Accepting bribes 185 1.109 0.376 1 5 1.133 1.076 
Justifiable: Woman becomes 
housewife 
185 3.714 1.108 1 5 3.724 3.700 
Position Economy: Self 185 6.341 2.321 0 10 6.162 6.575 
Position Economy: AfD 185 6.184 2.184 0 10 6.038 6.375 
Position Way of Life: Self 185 6.222 2.703 0 10 6.543 5.800 
Position Way of Life: AfD 185 6.378 1.893 0 10 6.543 6.163 
Position Identity: Self 185 6.703 2.362 0 10 6.819 6.550 
Position Identity: AfD 185 6.314 1.690 0 10 6.410 6.188 
Position EU: Self 185 8.416 2.200 0 10 8.352 8.500 
Position EU: AfD 185 8.086 1.937 0 10 8.048 8.138 
Desired influence: Labor 
unions 
185 1.870 0.755 1 4 1.886 1.850 
Desired influence: Employer 
associations 
185 1.865 0.641 1 4 1.857 1.875 
Desired influence: States 185 2.681 0.745 1 4 2.686 2.675 
Desired influence: 
Constitutional Court 
184 3.201 0.795 1 4 3.192 3.213 
Desired influence: 
International Courts 
185 1.676 0.775 1 4 1.695 1.650 
Desired influence: EU 185 1.422 0.595 1 4 1.400 1.450 
Desired influence: Referenda 185 3.562 0.682 1 4 3.676 3.413 
Proud to be German 185 2.070 0.933 1 4 2.000 2.163 
Like: USA 185 4.503 3.025 0 10 4.381 4.663 
Like: China 184 3.560 2.598 0 10 3.558 3.563 
Like: EU 184 2.158 2.387 0 10 1.865 2.538 
Like: UN 185 4.238 2.956 0 10 4.143 4.363 
Like: France 184 4.337 2.541 0 10 4.343 4.329 
Like: UK 185 5.524 2.423 0 10 5.390 5.700 
Like: Austria 184 7.141 1.928 0 10 7.286 6.949 
Like: Switzerland 184 7.908 2.082 0 10 8.095 7.658 
Like: Greece 185 3.216 2.351 0 10 3.257 3.163 
Like: Italy 185 4.484 2.432 0 10 4.657 4.253 
Like: Turkey 184 1.973 1.979 0 10 1.673 2.363 
Like: Israel 185 4.427 3.293 0 10 4.552 4.263 
Important: Germany being a 
democracy 
185 9.146 1.792 0 10 9.248 9.013 
Lots of political groups cause 
chaos in society 
184 2.076 0.966 1 5 2.058 2.100 
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Best way to let experts find 
solutions for pol. Problems 
184 2.815 1.241 1 5 2.913 2.688 
Vote of educated should count 
more 
185 1.832 1.161 1 5 1.771 1.913 
Large amount of public with 
inadequate political knowledge 
185 4.097 0.945 1 5 4.086 4.112 
In a difficult situation, 
everyone should follow gov. 
185 2.119 1.015 1 5 2.171 2.050 
Note: Bold entries indicate that entries are significantly higher based on a 95-percent confidence level.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table B3. Descriptive statistics of other programmatic items, 2015 sample 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Petry 
Voters 
Lucke 
Voters 
Greece should leave Eurozone 183 4.601 0.711 1 5 4.610 4.590 
Relax austerity measures in 
Eurozone 
183 2.454 1.320 1 5 2.105 2.923 
After NSA-scandal, Germany 
should become more 
independent from USA 
185 4.249 1.007 1 5 4.419 4.025 
EU should adopt Australia’s 
strict asylum policy (sending 
all boats back) 
185 4.189 1.129 1 5 4.4 3.913 
Minimum wage was a mistake 184 3.250 1.264 1 5 3.105 3.443 
Like: USA 185 3.995 2.955 0 10 3.581 4.538 
Like: Russia 184 5.864 2.891 0 10 6.731 4.738 
Like: Pegida 184 5.793 3.193 0 10 7.144 4.038 
Note: Bold entries indicate that entries are significantly higher based on a 95-percent confidence level.  
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Appendix Table B4. Robustness tests with positional programmatic variables (models 1-2), 
different measurement for social media consumption (model 3), and like-differences as 
dependent variable (model 4) 
 1 2 3 4 
H1: Political Activism  1.36*** 
(3.22) 
1.28*** 
(3.01) 
2.90*** 
(4.28) 
H2: Interaction Term  
Regime Satisfaction * Social Media 
 -1.64** 
(2.50) 
-1.41** 
(2.07) 
-3.54** 
(2.55) 
Social Media  5.04*** 
(2.82) 
4.76** 
(2.49) 
9.39** 
(2.45) 
Regime Satisfaction  0.94 
(1.64) 
0.28 
(0.70) 
2.13 
(1.58) 
Position: Economy 0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.29) 
-0.20 
(1.00) 
Position: Way of Life 0.04 
(0.47) 
0.02 
(0.23) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
Position: Identity 0.03 
(0.31) 
0.07 
(0.71) 
0.05 
(0.52) 
0.29 
(1.32) 
Position: EU -0.10 
(1.10) 
-0.15 
(1.36) 
-0.17 
(1.54) 
-0.29 
(1.46) 
Position: Intra-Party2015 0.45*** 
(3.98) 
0.54*** 
(4.48) 
0.55*** 
(4.67) 
1.03*** 
(5.43) 
Seeking Political Career -0.59* 
(1.93) 
-0.90** 
(2.30) 
-0.91** 
(2.34) 
-1.78** 
(2.48) 
Social Status -0.21 
(1.57) 
-0.23 
(1.62) 
0.20 
(1.37) 
-0.54* 
(1.81) 
High Position 0.60 
(0.98) 
1.17 
(1.62) 
1.19 
(1.56) 
1.52 
(1.10) 
Civil Servant 0.74 
(1.08) 
0.84 
(1.26) 
1.09 
(1.51) 
2.37 
(1.60) 
Self-Employed 0.75 
(1.49) 
1.30** 
(2.15) 
1.16* 
(1.93) 
2.61** 
(2.32) 
Not Working 3.13*** 
(2.88) 
3.53*** 
(3.01) 
3.59*** 
(3.00) 
4.05** 
(2.57) 
AfD Member -0.23 
(0.46) 
-1.60** 
(2.46) 
-1.60** 
(2.39) 
-2.46** 
(2.00) 
Age -0.00 
(0.27) 
-0.02 
(1.31) 
-0.02 
(1.11) 
-0.06 
(1.43) 
Education Level 0.03 
(0.27) 
-0.02 
(0.23) 
-0.03 
(0.19) 
0.33 
(1.38) 
Female -0.45 
(0.73) 
-0.96 
(1.43) 
-0.90 
(1.27) 
-0.87 
(0.52) 
East German 
 
 
1.60*** 
(3.18) 
1.54** 
(2.54) 
1.60*** 
(2.68) 
1.55 
(1.45) 
Observations 182 177 117 177 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2365 0.3270 0.3282 0.3598 
Log likelihood -95.11 -81.37 -81.24  
Note: *** p≤0.01; ** p≤0.05; * p≤0.1. Absolute Z-values in parentheses. Social Media in model 4 discounts for TV 
consumption and is based on social media – (1/2 * TV). 
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Appendix Table B5. Continued robustness tests with factor scores for index variables 
 5 6 7 8 9 
H1: Political Activism 0.79*** 
(2.79) 
  0.89** 
(2.55) 
1.35** 
(2.48) 
H2: Interaction Term  
Regime Satisfaction * Social Media 
-1.06** 
(2.19) 
  -1.45** 
(2.50) 
-2.24** 
(2.45) 
Social Media 0.24 
(0.56) 
  0.77 
(1.36) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
Regime Satisfaction 0.37 
(0.88) 
  1.30** 
(2.32) 
1.61* 
(1.89) 
Restricting Immigration  0.27 
(1.25) 
-0.05 
(0.17) 
-0.13 
(0.41) 
-0.15 
(0.24) 
Leave EU  0.13 
(1.02) 
-0.03 
(0.19) 
0.09 
(0.51) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
Reduce Income Inequality  -0.09 
(0.55) 
-0.18 
(0.98) 
-0.29 
(1.45) 
-0.51 
(1.43) 
Support Free Trade  -0.19 
(0.95) 
0.11 
(0.34) 
-0.06 
(0.17) 
0.16 
(0.33) 
Like Russia   -0.06 
(0.66) 
-0.03 
(0.39) 
-0.20 
(1.26) 
Like Pegida 2015   0.40*** 
(4.49) 
0.45*** 
(4.22) 
0.89*** 
(6.37) 
Support TTIP2015   0.53*** 
(2.64) 
-0.46** 
(2.07) 
-0.61 
(1.61) 
Support Russia-Sanctions2015   -0.36* 
(1.87) 
-0.34 
(1.55) 
-0.96** 
(2.52) 
Seeking Political Career -0.26 
(1.14) 
-0.34 
(1.63) 
-0.37 
(1.43) 
-0.79* 
(1.80) 
-1.50** 
(2.16) 
Social Status -0.11 
(0.83) 
-0.12 
(0.97) 
-0.12 
(0.89) 
-0.12 
(0.76) 
-0.33 
(1.32) 
High Position 0.58 
(0.99) 
0.32 
(0.60) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.41 
(0.52) 
-0.26 
(0.20) 
Civil Servant 0.50 
(0.83) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.88 
(0.44) 
Self-Employed 0.77* 
(1.66) 
0.53 
(1.20) 
0.88 
(1.51) 
1.33* 
(1.94) 
1.68* 
(1.72) 
Not Working 3.03** 
(2.47) 
2.64** 
(2.52) 
3.06*** 
(3.15) 
3.57*** 
(2.60) 
2.75* 
(1.86) 
AfD Member -1.02* 
(1.93) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-1.00 
(1.34) 
-0.48 
(0.41) 
Age -0.01 
(0.55) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.79) 
-0.03 
(1.12) 
-0.06 
(1.59) 
Education Level -0.05 
(0.51) 
-0.03 
(0.29) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
0.27 
(1.10) 
Female -1.26* 
(1.92) 
-0.85 
(1.33) 
-0.70 
(0.85) 
-1.51 
(1.46) 
-1.27 
(0.73) 
East German 
 
 
1.38** 
(2.52) 
1.72*** 
(3.20) 
1.71*** 
(2.70) 
1.57** 
(2.29) 
1.44 
(1.44) 
Observations 177 178 177 172 172 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1898 0.1401 0.3476 0.3938 0.4761 
Log likelihood -97.97 -104.92 -79.07 -71.25  
Note: *** p≤0.01; ** p≤0.05; * p≤0.1. Absolute Z-values in parentheses. 
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Appendix Table B6. Principal factor analysis for the index variables 
Index Variable Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Factor 1 
Eigenvalue 
Factor 2 
Eigenvalue 
Political Activism 
(6 items) 
0.878 3.326 0.152 
Regime Satisfaction 
(7 items) 
0.779 2.456 0.221 
Restricting Immigration 
(3 items) 
0.676 1.173 -0.036 
Seeking Political Career 
(2 items) 
0.862 1.331 -0.184 
 
 
Appendix Table B7. Descriptive statistics of index composites 
 Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Petry 
Voters 
Lucke 
Voters 
Political Activism 181 1.834 0.753 1 3.833 1.942 1.688 
Political Activism - Factor 181 0 0.945 -0.945 2.385 0.134 -0.181 
Putting up posters 182 1.582 0.899 1 4 1.673 1.462 
Handing out flyers 184 1.870 1.016 1 4 2.019 1.675 
Attending demonstrations 183 1.705 0.785 1 4 1.817 1.557 
Attending party meetings 184 2.179 1.074 1 4 2.240 2.100 
Donating to the party 183 2.016 0.946 1 4 2.067 1.949 
Canvassing/Campaigning 184 1.728 1.009 1 4 1.837 1.588 
Regime Satisfaction 183 2.704 0.757 1.143 5 2.558 2.897 
Regime Satisfaction - Factor 183 0 0.890 -1.839 2.565 -0.174 0.229 
Votes are counted fairly 185 3.541 1.132 1 5 3.333 3.813 
TV does not favor government 184 2.158 1.198 1 5 1.943 2.443 
Fair news coverage of elections 184 2.060 1.062 1 5 2.019 2.113 
Freedom of opinion for everyone 185 3.038 1.184 1 5 2.952 3.150 
Human rights are protected 185 3.589 1.423 1 5 3.467 3.750 
No campaign disadvantages for 
some parties 
185 1.757 1.048 1 5 1.505 2.088 
Germany is governed democratically 185 2.751 1.190 1 5 2.648 2.888 
Restricting Immigration 183 2.454 0.613 1 4 2.519 2.367 
Restricting Immigration - Factor 183 0 0.805 -1.966 1.707 0.094 -0.123 
Allow immigration: Same 
race/ethnic group 
183 1.754 0.726 1 4 1.769 1.734 
Allow immigration: Other 
race/ethnic group 
183 2.661 0.822 1 4 2.740 2.557 
Allow immigration: From poor non-
European countries 
183 2.945 0.810 1 4 3.048 2.810 
Seeking Political Career 184 1.459 0.603 1 3 1.443 1.481 
Seeking Political Career - Factor 184 0 0.870 -0.663 2.228 -0.024 0.032 
Engage to achieve party positions 184 1.446 0.625 1 3 1.429 1.468 
Engage to become politician 185 1.470 0.660 1 3 1.457 1.488 
Note: Bold entries indicate that entries are significantly higher based on a 95-percent confidence level.  
 
 
